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Balancing the Scales of Justice: Do perceptions of buyers’ justice 
drive suppliers’ social performance?  
 
Abstract  
A major challenge for supply chain managers is how to manage sourcing relationships to ensure 
reliable and predictable actions of distant suppliers. The extant research into sustainable supply 
chain management (SSCM) has traditionally focused on the transactional and collaboration 
approaches through which buyers encourage suppliers to act responsibly. However, little effort 
has been devoted to investigating the factors that underpin and enable effective implementation of 
these two approaches, or to exploring alternative approaches to help sustain an acceptable level of 
social performance from suppliers. Building on organisational justice theory, we developed a 
framework in which we propose that buyers’ justice (i.e. distributive, procedural and 
interactional) as perceived by suppliers can serve as an alternative and complementary vehicle to 
the conventional sustainability governance approaches for driving the social justice exhibited by 
suppliers. The paper sheds new light on an alternative relational approach to help to restrain 
potentially harmful acts of suppliers. It provides a foundation for new research avenues in the 
SSCM context and supports more informed decision making by practitioners.      
Keywords: Justice; Fairness; Supplier; Supply Chain; Sustainability; Responsible behaviour; 
Social Performance.  
Introduction 
Outsourcing to suppliers and establishing production networks in emerging markets have become 
increasingly popular strategies among organisations seeking to achieve cost savings or as a 
potential source of competitive advantage (Locke et al. 2009; Wagner and Johnson 2007). 
However, the shift from domestic purchasing strategy to international sourcing may not always 
achieve the desired goals due to reputational risks that can arise from internal unethical actions of 
suppliers, such as the use of child or forced labour and unfair payment practices (Spekman and 
Davis 2004; Joo et al. 2010). Under escalating pressure from customers, trade associations, non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) and from the fear of potential supply chain disruptions, 
organisations have turned to transactional and collaboration approaches as the means to help them 
sustain acceptable levels of suppliers’ internal social performance (Klassen and Vereecke 2012; 
Sancha et al. 2016: Huq et al. 2016). The transactional approach (often perceived as arm’s length) 
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emphasises the use of socially sustainable transactional practices (SSTPs), for example 
certification and auditing, to increase supplier compliance to buyers’ social requirements (Jiang 
2009; Boyd et al. 2007). The collaboration approach focuses on the importance of socially 
sustainable collaboration practices (SSCPs), for example supplier development, to build 
suppliers’ capabilities and improve overall sustainability performance (Seuring and Müller 2008; 
Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Huq et al. 2016). 
Although conventional socially sustainable supply chain (SSSC) practices (SSTPs and SSCPs) 
have been hailed as important governance mechanisms for sustainable supply chains, mounting 
anecdotal and recent empirical evidence indicates that they may not effectively be helping buying 
organisations to maximise supplier compliance to social requirements (Sancha et al. 2016; 
Soundararajan and Brown 2016; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). In particular, the SSTPs 
are considered less likely to influence suppliers to sustain improvements in their working 
conditions and standards (Sancha et al. 2016; Locke et al. 2009; Lund-Thomsen 2008). It has 
been argued that monitoring and assessment tend to encourage suppliers to do just enough to 
meet threshold requirements (and hence avoid ‘being caught’) (Jiang 2009) and have even been 
associated with increases in the overall levels of violations by suppliers (Lim and Phillips 2008; 
Yu 2008). On the other hand, many organisations are reluctant to establish SSCPs with suppliers 
due to the high ‘sustainability-specific’ investment implementation costs (Lund-Thomsen and 
Lindgreen 2014) which can be magnified by suppliers’ resistance and opportunistic behaviours 
(Touboulic and Walker 2015; Huq et al. 2014; Jiang 2009). Moreover, the narrower applicability 
of collaborative approaches to selected suppliers (Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014) and the 
generally long time needed to develop, implement and achieve the expected outcomes (Klassen 
and Vereecke 2012; Grosvold et al. 2014) has made SSCPs less attractive. Yet, despite the 
increasing recognition of the challenges associated with SSTPs and SSCPs, little attention has 
been devoted to understanding the factors that could enable their more effective implementation. 
While the majority of the extant literature has traditionally focused on the SSTPs and SSCPs to 
address suppliers’ existing social issues, minimising the likelihood of these issues occurring by 
eradicating their root causes has, surprisingly, been overlooked. Although suppliers’ institutional 
or industrial conditions, for example weak regulations and high labour intensity respectively, can 
give rise to adverse social issues in their facilities (Huq et al. 2014; Crane 2013), it is often the 
case that these issues are also driven by buyers’ unfair purchasing practices. To cope with 
continual cost reduction pressure from buyers, suppliers may feel forced to transfer part of the 
pressure to their workers by eroding workers’ welfare, neglecting working condition 
improvement and using child labour (Jiang 2009; Awaysheh and Klassen 2010; Sancha et al. 
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2016). Moreover, due to the regular technological breakthroughs, demand uncertainty, rapid 
changes in customer preferences and shrinking product life cycles in the modern marketplace, 
buyers are frequently requesting shorter lead times and higher flexibility (i.e. quality, quantity 
and mix) from suppliers. As a result, suppliers may either impose excessive overtime, or speed up 
production processes to levels beyond normal acceptable expectations of workers’ physical 
ability to meet these requirements (Roth 2008; Yu 2008; Jiang 2009; Lund-Thomsen and 
Lindgreen 2014).  
A growing amount of research has demonstrated the value derived from justice perception in 
buyer-supplier relationships (e.g. Kumar et al. 1995; Zaefarian et al. 2016; Poppo and Zhou 
2014). Justice in buyer-supplier relationships is evidenced based on the extent to which 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice are established (Luo et al. 2015; Narasimhan et 
al. 2013). Ensuring fair procedures and interactions and equitably distributed returns between 
buyer and supplier can achieve desirable outcomes and facilitate the types of activities that are 
critical for the ongoing and effective functioning of the relationship (Kumar et al. 1995). Justice 
has, for example, been shown to enhance relationship quality (Muylle and Standaert 2016), 
satisfaction (Praxmarer-Carus et al. 2013), commitment (Zaefarian et al. 2016) trust (Hofer et al. 
2012), innovation (Shockley and Turner 2016), cooperation (Wagner et al. 2011; Ling-yee 2010) 
and knowledge sharing (Liu et al. 2012) in the relationship. However, the significance of justice 
in enhancing the implementation of SSSC practices and in driving suppliers to establish social 
sustainability has largely been unexplored in sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) 
research to date. Although Boyd et al.’s (2007) study has advanced our understating of how 
procedural justice in corporate social responsibility (CSR) programmes may increase suppliers’ 
compliance, our understanding of the potential role of distributive, procedural and interactional 
justice dimensions on the implementation of SSTPs and SSCPs and on suppliers’ internal social 
performance is underdeveloped. It is this gap which the present study seeks to address. This gap 
persists despite recent research suggesting that each of the three dimensions of justice are 
essential and that a high level of one dimension will not compensate for a low level of another 
(Wang et al. 2014; Narasimhan et al. 2013) since each dimension may address different aspects of 
the buyer-supplier relationship, including economic, structural and social aspects (Lou et al. 
2015). This study aims to address this gap by integrating the three justice dimensions into a 
holistic model that provides a better understanding of how each dimension can contribute to the 
implementation of SSTPs and SSCPs and to suppliers’ internal social performance.  
To achieve our aim, we draw on the relevant literature from SSCM and organisational justice 
theory to develop a conceptual framework in which we propose that buyer’s justice (i.e. 
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distributive, procedural and interactional) as perceived by suppliers can serve as an alternative 
and complementary vehicle to the conventional sustainability governance practices (i.e. SSTPs 
and SSCPs) in driving social justice exhibited by suppliers. Specifically, the framework first 
examines how SSTPs and SSCPs might influence supplier’ internal social performance. It then 
disentangles how buyer’s distributive, procedural, and interactional justice might individually and 
interactively drive supplier’s internal social performance. Finally, the framework establishes the 
moderating effect of the three justice dimensions on the relationship between SSSC practices (i.e. 
SSTPs, SSCPs) and supplier’s internal social performance.  In doing so, our study addresses the 
research question: how can organisational buyer justice improve suppliers’ internal social 
performance?   
Our paper contributes to the supply chain management literature in two ways. First, this study 
highlights the centrality of buyers’ justice in managing supply chain social issues. Specifically, 
the study proposes how buyers’ distributive, procedural and interactional justice can lead to 
improvement in supplier’ internal social performance. This extends the current literature, which 
has suggested that conventional practices such as certification (monitoring) and supplier 
development (collaboration) can be employed by buying firms to ensure the sustainability of their 
supply chains. Thus, this study represents a departure from the dominant conventional social 
sustainability governance approach by suggesting an alternative approach to managing supplier 
sustainability performance. Second, the study simultaneously investigates and disentangles the 
unique role of each of the three prominent justice dimensions in facilitating the implementation of 
SSTPs and SSCPs. Specifically, the study suggests a moderating effect of the justice dimensions 
on the relationship between SSSC practices and suppliers’ internal social performance. Thus, this 
research proposes a complementarity effect through the three justice dimensions.  
The paper develops as follows. In the next section a brief theoretical background on SSSC 
practices, suppliers’ social performance and organisational justice is provided before our 
conceptual framework and associated propositions are developed. Following this, we outline our 
implications for theory and practice and identify future research directions.  
Theoretical background  
The existing literature that informs our conceptual development in this paper originates from two 
main perspectives. First, we examine the SSCM literature to identify and elaborate on the 
different SSSC practices and suppliers’ internal social performance. Second, we discuss the 
organisational justice literature and provide a brief review of the current research on justice in 
buyer-supplier relationships. 
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Socially sustainable supply chain practices 
In the current literature the transactional and collaboration approaches have been identified as 
those governing supplier sustainability performance (Gimenez et al. 2012; Klassen and Vereecke 
2012; Marshall et al. 2015; Sancha et al. 2016). These governance approaches have their specific 
assumptions and theoretical underpinnings. Accordingly, different mechanisms have been 
proposed under each approach to support or enhance suppliers’ social performance, and a number 
of limitations associated with their use have been put forward. Table 1 summarises the main 
differences between the transactional and collaboration approaches.    
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
Based on Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory (Williams 1975), the transactional approach 
rests on the assumption that suppliers’ social misconduct represents a form of opportunistic 
behaviour (Carter and Rogers 2008; Sancha et al. 2016). Grounded in this assumption, the 
transactional approach points to different socially sustainable transactional practices (SSTPs) 
through which a buying firm can assess, monitor, audit and seek to guide and control suppliers’ 
behaviour relating to suppliers’ working conditions, employee welfare and the elimination of the 
use of child labour (Jiang 2009; Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Huq et al. 2016; Sancha et al. 2016; 
Marshall et al. 2015). SSTPs are used to evaluate the extent to which suppliers conform to the 
societal expectations that are formulated in buyers’ criteria (e.g. codes of conduct), stipulated in 
regulations or pre-specified in international standards (Ciliberti et al. 2009; Mamic 2005). They 
therefore constitute a process concerned with ensuring alignment between policy and practice 
(Grosvold et al. 2014). This requires formulating the assessment criteria and the collection and 
processing of information from suppliers and other involved parties (Gallear et al. 2012; Klassen 
and Vereecke 2012). The process can be accomplished by requesting that suppliers provide key 
performance indicator measures, complete a risk assessment relating to the current social 
conditions at their facilities (Sancha et al. 2015; Grosvold et al. 2014), or instigate an audit of 
their operations using a local independent third-party auditor (Huq et al. 2016). Verification of 
information provided by suppliers (Leire and Mont 2010) or by local auditors and government 
officials has, in light of corruption however, been noted to represent a major problem in the 
implementation of SSTPs (Jiang 2009 and Huq et al. 2014). Alternatively, buyers can carry out 
the monitoring and evaluation process by inspecting and auditing suppliers’ progress using their 
own auditors or by employing their choice of a third-party auditor (Huq et al. 2016). Based on the 
outcome of this process, buying firms may warn or impose direct sanctions on violating suppliers, 
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or offer incentives to compliant suppliers in the form of longer-term contracts and/or increased 
order volumes (Porteous et al. 2015; Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009; Pedersen and Andersen 
2006). In addition to helping to ensure supplier adherence to expectations, SSTPs may also help 
the buying firm to establish legitimacy by signalling its commitment towards social sustainability 
to a variety of stakeholders (Vurro et al. 2009; Boyd et al. 2007). Despite the perceived benefits 
however, it is also widely agreed that codes of conduct and other standards tend to be open to 
broad interpretation, are often accompanied by a lack of the involvement of the suppliers in the 
planning and setting of sustainability goals (Yawar and Seuring 2017) and lack of sharing of the 
implementation costs (Yu 2008), and moreover that they often ignore the culture and economic 
context in which suppliers operate (Huq et al. 2014; Ciliberti et al. 2009). 
Grounded in the Relational View (RV) (Dyer and Singh 1998), the collaboration approach 
assumes that close collaboration with suppliers and other stakeholders (i.e. customers and NGOs) 
can significantly improve suppliers’ social performance (Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Rodriguez 
et al. 2016). Collaboration builds a bridge between buyer and suppliers by opening up two-way 
dialogue that enables them jointly to address social issues (Jiang 2009; Klassen and Vereecke 
2012). Unlike the transactional approach, the collaboration approach emphasises a longer-term 
view by enhancing and building suppliers’ capabilities to manage social issues (Klassen and 
Vereecke 2012).  Socially sustainable collabration practcies (SSCPs) typically include setting up 
supplier development and education programmes, sharing knowledge with suppliers, organizing 
meetings and conferences, awarding suppliers subsidies to obtain third-party certification, and 
jointly developing new products or processes that improve the health and safety of the employees 
(Jiang 2009; Gallear et al. 2012; Marshall et al. 2015; Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Porteous et al. 
2015; Sancha et al. 2015). SSCPs can therefore be regarded as sustainability-specific assets, 
knowledge-sharing routines and complementary resources in buyer-supplier relationships 
(Dyer and Singh 1998).  
Organisations may extend the collaborative reach beyond suppliers to include non-traditional 
supply chain actors such as civil societies and NGOs (Tencati et al. 2008; Rodriguez et al. 2016). 
Although collaborating with such actors - who are likely to have different strategies, 
organizational structures, and goals (e.g. non-profit) - can pose unique challenges (Pagell and 
Shevchenko 2014), they have been shown to play a vital role in the implementation of SSCPs by 
providing unique and complementary resources (Rodriguez et al. 2016; Gold et al. 2013; Perez-
Aleman and Sandilands 2008; Tencati et al. 2008).  The resources provided by actors such as 
NGOs, which usually take the form of bespoke (situation–specific) knowledge for tailoring 
supplier development programmes to match supplier needs and bridge capability gaps, 
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complement buying firms’ resources (e.g. knowledge transfer and logistical routines) to 
increase the effectiveness of the implementation of SSCPs. 
Although the collaboration approach has been shown to positively affect suppliers’ social 
performance, it has also been argued that in reality it may only be implementable with a limited 
number of suppliers due to the high associated implementation costs and the long time needed to 
develop, implement and achieve the expected outcomes (Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Lund-
Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014).  
Suppliers’ internal social performance  
The shift from conventional supply chain management where the focus is on maximising 
economic value (Gunasekaran et al. 2004), to SSCM where the emphasis is on simultaneously 
sustaining economic, environmental and social performance (Carter and Rogers 2008; Seuring 
and Müller 2008) has further increased the complexity of measuring supply chain performance 
(Beske-Janssen et al. 2015; Ahi et al. 2016). While measurement of the economic and 
environmental performance of supply chains is relatively advanced, the measurement of social 
performance is still very much underdeveloped (Hutchins and Sutherland 2008; Sarkis et al. 
2010; Ahi and Searcy 2015). This, in part, can be attributed to the relative importance that has 
been attached to each type of performance and also to the nature of social performance per se. 
The majority of the extant research has followed the instrumental logic in which the economic 
performance of sustainable supply chain initiatives has been the primary focus of investigation 
(Gao and Bansal 2013; Montabon et al. 2016). Moreover, the majority of the extant research has 
also focused on environmental issues, arguably because they have been perceived to have the 
potential to make more wide ranging impact than social issues.  As Montabon et al. (2016, p.15) 
noted, “All environmental issues have social consequences, but not all social issues are 
environmental”.  The general lack of agreement on the scope and nature of social issues in supply 
chains is another possible reason for social performance measurement’s underdevelopment (Ahi 
and Searcy 2015). The lack of consensus is likely to be due to the fact that social issues reflect 
society’s baseline expectations for improving human behaviour, which not only change over time 
but vary according to the culture in which the organisation and its suppliers are based (Awaysheh 
and Klassen 2010). Child labour, for example, is considered unacceptable in the vast majority of, 
if not all, Western countries, however it is viewed as an acceptable vehicle of family support and 
early training for children in a profession in some parts of Asia (Khan 2007; Lund-Thomsen and 
Lindgreen 2014). As a result, examining social performance in supply chains has received far less 
attention from both sustainability scholars and practitioners (Ahi and Searcy 2015; Beske-Janssen 
et al. 2015; Zorzini et al. 2015). 
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Suppliers’ social misconduct can have a detrimental impact on their employees’ safety, health 
and welfare, and can extend to affecting the well-being of local communities and local customers 
(Klassen and Vereecke 2012). Accordingly, suppliers’ social performance can be seen to 
encompass both an internal and an external dimension (Huq et al. 2016; Yawar and Seuring 
2017). The external social performance relates to the support and well-being of the local 
communities within which the supplier operates (Huq et al. 2016). On the other hand, suppliers’ 
internal social performance is associated with the working conditions, safety and healthcare, 
working hours, payment rates, disciplinary practices and child employment ‘policies’ adopted 
within the suppliers’ premises (Yawar and Seuring 2017; Zorzini et al. 2015; Sancha et al. 2016; 
Awaysheh and Klassen 2010). In this paper, we focus on the internal social performance for two 
primary reasons. First, alongside macro factors related to the suppliers’ environment (e.g. 
institutional, cultural and socio-economic factors) (Crane 2013), social responsibility 
deteriorations within suppliers’ operations are also partly driven by buyers’ unfair purchasing 
practices such as cost pressure, shortened lead times and exacting requirements for high 
flexibility (Barrientos 2013; Jiang 2009). Second, buying firms are more likely to implement 
SSSC practices (SSTPs and SSCPs) to improve the suppliers’ internal social performance, as 
inadequate or reducing performance (for example adverse workplace incidents) has the potential 
to negatively affect suppliers’ internal operations and hence cause supply chain disruptions for 
the buyer (Pullman et al. 2008; Rodriguez et al. 2016). 
Justice 
The theory of organisational justice has been extensively researched at an intra-organisational 
level (Fortin et al. 2016) which has traditionally focused on individuals’ and groups’ perception 
of workplace justice (Li and Cropanzano 2009). It is only recently that justice theory has begun to 
receive interest at the inter-orgnisational level, including at the level of the supply chain 
(Zaefarian et al. 2016; Theodorakopoulos et al. 2015). In this context, research has started to 
emerge highlighting the role and outcomes of perception of justice in supply chain relationships. 
Table 2 provides a detailed analysis of the current empirical work that has examined justice in a 
supply chain relationship context. Justice is considered to be a foundation for supply chain 
relationships where each of its dimensions plays a unique and distinct role in sustaining the 
relationship (Trada and Goyal 2017; Yilmaz et al. 2004). Distributive justice is connected to the 
economic aspect of the relationship, procedural justice to the structural part of the relationship, 
and interactional justice is associated with the social side (Luo et al. 2015).    
-------------------------------- 
Insert Table 2 about here 
-------------------------------- 
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Distributive justice refers to the extent to which a supplier perceives the allocation of outcomes as 
proportional to the costs incurred from the relationship (Luo 2007a). This view is based on the 
logic of equity theory (Adams 1965), and advances that a supplier will compares its own ratio of 
perceived inputs to outcomes against that of the buyer. The comparison creates a perception of 
either equity or inequity. The supplier experiences an equity condition when it perceives that its 
outcomes-to-inputs ratio is equal to that of the buyer. In contrast, the supplier experiences an 
inequity condition when its ratio is perceived to be less than, or to exceed, that of the buyer 
(Greenberg 1982). However, the allocation of outcomes based on ‘equality’ or ‘need’ may also 
shape the perception of distributive justice in the relationship (Kashyap et al. 2008). Equality-
based distributive justice is perceived when the supplier receives comparable outcomes to that 
received by the buyer irrespective of their inputs, whereas need-based distributive justice is 
established when they obtain outcomes based on their known needs and regardless of their 
contributions (Deutsch 1975). The allocation of outcomes based on equity, equality or need, and 
thus determining the perception of distributive justice, in a given relationship depends on the 
primary aim of that relationship (Deutsch 1975). In business relationships (e.g. buyers-supplier), 
which is established mainly for economic productivity, equity rule will be the dominant rule in 
the allocation of outcomes, and thus shaping the perception of distributive justice in the 
relationship (Deutsch 1975). Accordingly, we use equity-based distributive justice in this paper as 
suppliers are more likely to use equity rule to evaluate the extent of distributive justice in the 
relationship.  
Procedural justice refers to the degree to which a supplier perceives the procedures and policies 
that govern all relationship aspects as impartial (Blancero and Ellram 1997). Suppliers assess the 
fairness of the procedures relating to pricing, delivery, flexibility, product quality, responsibilities 
and resource allocations in the relationship (Kumar et al. 1995; Zaefarian et al. 2016; Wang et al. 
2014). A supplier’s perception of fair procedures is established when the procedures are deemed 
to be consistent, bias-free, accurate, correctable, ethical (Leventhal 1980) and conform to 
contractual specifications (Luo 2007a). Nevertheless, suppliers may not use all of the criteria to 
judge the fairness of a particular procedure, but instead might choose to allocate weights to and 
apply different criteria in different situations (Leventhal 1980).  
Interactional justice refers to the extent to which a supplier perceives the interpersonal treatment 
and information received during the enactment of relationship procedures to be fair (Wang et al. 
2014). Thus, interactional justice relates to the communication and interaction process between 
the buyer and supplier, and encompasses two aspects: interpersonal treatment and an 
informational aspect (Folger and Cropanzano 1998). With the interpersonal aspect, a higher 
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perception of interactional justice is perceived as a result of buyers treating suppliers with respect, 
sensitivity, politeness and dignity (Liu et al. 2012). For the informational component, a higher 
perception of interactional justice is fostered when the supplier is provided with ample, timely 
and truthful justification and explanation behind a decision or an outcome (Colquitt 2001; Tyler 
and Bies 1990). 
Conceptual framework and propositions 
Our proposed conceptual framework establishes the relationship between socially sustainable 
supply chain (SSSC) practices, buyers’ justice and suppliers’ internal social performance (see 
Figure 1). The framework suggests that the implementation of socially sustainable transactional 
practices (SSTPs) has no impact on suppliers’ internal social performance, while the 
implementation of socially sustainable collaboration practices (SSCPs) has a positive effect. The 
framework also proposes that higher perceptions of buyers’ justice (i.e. distributive, procedural 
and interactional) are directly and positively related to suppliers’ internal social performance. 
Furthermore, the framework predicts that perceptions of buyers’ justice help to facilitate the 
effective implementation of SSSC practices. Specifically, that buyer justice dimensions positively 
moderate the relationship between SSSC practices and suppliers’ internal social performance.  
-------------------------------- 
Insert Figure 1 about here 
-------------------------------- 
The proposed conceptualisation was the outcome of a literature review to analyse the prior 
research on SSCM and justice in buyer-supplier relationships. Our review followed the 
systematic database search process described in the systematic literature review methodology 
(Tranfield et al. 2003). We first developed a set of central keywords (“responsib*” OR “ethic*” 
OR “sustainab*” OR “social*” OR justice OR fairness AND “supply chain” OR “buyer-supplier” 
OR supplier OR purchasing OR sourcing) to search the literature based on the article title, 
abstract and keywords. Having located salient contributions we followed Greenhalgh and 
Peacock’s (2005) advice and located further literature through cross-referencing. To ensure the 
comprehensiveness of our search, we employed a backward and forward snowballing technique 
(Webster and Watson, 2002). We then chronologically summarised these salient contributions 
and extracted a schema of relevant themes and observations within the assembled body of 
literature. As our content analysis proceeded, the conceptual framework emerged and continued 
to be refined until our review was complete. 
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We formulate our propositions in the next three sections. The first section focuses on the 
relationship between SSSC practices (SSTPs and SSCPs) and suppliers’ internal social 
performance. The second develops the relationship between buyers’ justice dimensions and 
suppliers’ internal social performance. Having presented the main effects, the third section 
establishes the moderating effects of buyers’ justice dimensions on the relationship between 
SSSC practices and suppliers’ internal social performance.    
SSSC practices and suppliers’ internal social performance  
A number of scholars have questioned the way in which SSSC management has been claimed to 
impact performance, arguing that combining social and environmental dimensions into a single 
concept makes separate analysis impossible, and hence creates theoretical ambiguity as to 
whether pursuing social initiatives in the supply chain can lead to performance improvements for 
associated partners (e.g. Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Marshall et al. 2016; Sancha et al. 2015). 
As a result of this critique, a new research stream has recently started to develop focused 
exclusively on the social dimension in order to gain a clearer understanding of its performance 
implications (e.g. Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Sancha et al. 2015; Huq et al. 2016). Prior 
research considers suppliers’ social performance improvement to be one of the essential goals of 
the implementation of SSSC practices. However, while attempts have been made to examine the 
impact of SSSC practices on buyers’ and suppliers’ economic performance (e.g. Hollos et al. 
2012; Marshall et al. 2016), attempts to examine its impact on suppliers’ social performance are 
rare (Sancha et al. 2015; Sancha et al. 2016; Huq et al. 2016).  
In the SSTP approach, objectives are specified, performance is audited, feedback is provided, 
progress is monitored and rewards and punishments are administered to align suppliers’ 
behaviour with buyers’ social criteria (Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Porteous et al. 2015). The 
growing literature on the social dimensions along with significant anecdotal evidence suggests 
that SSTPs are less likely to lead to observable progress. In an analysis of social and green supply 
chain practices, Hollos et al. (2012) found that the social practices (certification and compliance) 
had no effect on cost reduction and the operational performance of suppliers. This outcome was 
also observed by Marshall et al. (2016), who found that the use of process-based practices 
(monitoring and auditing) had no influence on suppliers’ performance. Yu (2008) examined the 
impact of the implementation of a code of conduct on labour standards (i.e. low-wage payment, 
freedom of association and collective bargaining) at Reebok’s suppliers in Chain. Their findings 
from semi-structured interviews demonstrated that corporate social responsibility (CSR) policy 
and the code of conduct were ineffective in addressing the social issues, and had even been 
related to an increase in the overall level of violations by suppliers. Huq et al. (2014) observed 
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that buyers’ monitoring and enforcement of a code of conduct can drive suppliers to hide 
workplace violations and instead pursue ‘mock’ compliance behaviours. Similarly, using data 
from non-compliant and compliant Chinese apparel and textile suppliers, Jiang (2009) revealed 
that buyer-to-supplier governance (i.e. auditing and monitoring) had no effect on supplier 
compliance to codes of conduct. More recently, in what appears to be the first dedicated 
examination of suppliers’ social performance, Sancha et al. (2016) found that the use of 
assessment practices by buying firms were not effective in enhancing suppliers’ social 
performance. Based on the above arguments we propose the following: 
Proposition 1a There is no relationship between SSTPs and suppliers’ internal social 
performance. 
Unlike SSTPs, SSCPs aim to reverse deteriorations in suppliers’ social performance by investing 
in enhancing their capabilities and opening up new market opportunities by developing new 
product and services (Marshall et al. 2015; Huq et al. 2016). In addition to their positive impact 
on the economic performance of supply chain members (Klassen and Vereecke 2012), SSCPs 
have been shown to drive social improvements in suppliers’ employee welfare (Sancha et al. 
2016). Collaboration facilitates the formation of interaction routines that enable the exchange of 
assets and knowledge for the tangible and effective improvement of environmental and social 
performance throughout the supply chain (Gualandris and Kalchschmidt 2016). Based on the 
resource-based view (Barney 1991), Sancha et al. (2015) found that buyer-supplier social 
sustainability joint-efforts and training sessions promote mutual learning and knowledge 
exchange, enabling suppliers to build specific capabilities to improve their social performance. 
Likewise, Jiang (2009) found that close collaboration between buyer and supplier through 
training and incentives increases suppliers’ compliance with codes of conduct. Sancha et al. 
(2016) found evidence that buyers’ direct collaborative involvement with and sustainability 
investments in suppliers increased their compliance with human rights, reduced child labour 
employment and improved safety and labour conditions. In their longitudinal study of 
multinational buyers and their developing country suppliers, Huq et al. (2016) discovered that 
buyers establish the foundation for improved social conditions and hence suppliers’ internal and 
external social performance, by collaborating with suppliers rather than using third-party auditors. 
Training for suppliers is strongly associated with a reduction in suppliers’ environmental and 
social violations and buyers’ operating costs (Porteous et al. 2015). These arguments provide 
clear support for the effectiveness of the collaborative approach, leading us to propose the 
following: 
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Proposition 1b There is a positive relationship between SSCPs and suppliers’ internal 
social performance. 
Buyers’ justice and suppliers’ internal social performance 
Buyers, in general, continually tend to demand price reductions, non-cost related payments, 
discounts, quality improvements or extended payment terms and warranty periods (Fearne et al. 
2005; Henke et al. 2008) from their suppliers, all of which represent an extra cost to the supplier. 
These often unethical exploitations of suppliers are commonly attributed to buyers’ bargaining 
power (Fassin 2005). Suppliers might depend on particular buyers because a high proportion of 
their goods or services are purchased by those buyers. If the buyer threatens to switch to a 
different supplier to gain a price reduction, the potential consequences of losing the buyer might 
be more detrimental to the supplier than if it accepted the price reductions (Schleper et al. 2017). 
This creates a perception of negative inequity, which in turn increases the supplier’s resentment, 
and subsequently increases its motivation/likelihood to seek to reduce the perceived inequity by 
enhancing output through opportunistic behaviours (Adams 1965; Brown et al. 2000). When a 
supplier is less powerful than the source of the perceived inequity (the buyer) attempts to restore 
equity will be largely indirect (Homans 1961). The supplier may seek to reduce costs by 
repeatedly passing cost savings on to workers by eroding their welfare, reducing investments in 
their working conditions or even by employing child labour in their facilities (Jiang 2009; 
Awaysheh and Klassen 2010). These violations of the social obligations and expectations 
represent various forms of negative opportunistic behaviours by the supplier (Sancha et al. 2016). 
Thus, a buyer’s unfair practices can in turn lead to a supplier’s unfair relationship with its 
workers. Conversely, a fair distribution of benefits in supply chain relationships can reduce a 
supplier’s motivation to behave opportunistically in this way (Luo et al. 2015). Perceptions of 
higher distributive justice enhance suppliers’ confidence in the fairness of future benefit and 
revenue allocation (Luo et al. 2015). Fair treatment in outcome distribution also removes fear of 
exploitation and can stimulate transparency (Luo 2007b). Therefore, if suppliers receive a 
proportional return for their efforts from buyers, they will be able to invest in improving 
workplace infrastructures and delivering fair payment to their workers, and they will be less 
likely to seek cost savings by employing child labour. Based on the above discussion we propose 
the following: 
Proposition 2a Buyers’ distributive justice is positively related to suppliers’ internal social 
performance.  
To deal with demand uncertainty, escalating customer expectations and shrinking product life 
cycles, buyers may place orders with suppliers demanding unrealistic delivery times or with 
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volatile (changing) order volumes (Barrientos 2013). Making changes to contractual 
arrangements and unreasonably transferring risk to the supplier is an indication of unfair 
procedures (Fearne et al. 2005) since it violates the consistency criterion that shapes the 
perception of fair procedures. Vulnerable suppliers often have no option but to fulfil orders by 
adopting ‘hidden’ tactics to keep contracts and protect their own interests rather than seeking 
direct negotiation (or confrontation) with more powerful buyers (Liu et al. 2017; Brown et al. 
1995). They may consequently either force excessive overtime or accelerate production processes 
to a level that is beyond what is acceptable for workers’ normal physical ability (Yu 2008; Lund-
Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). Workers are pushed to perform tasks faster, creating 
unmanageable work overloads which in turn increase the likelihood of adverse workplace 
incidents (Wiengarten and Longoni 2018). Conversely, stability and consistency in buyers’ 
implementation of relationship procedures and policies reduces risk and increases suppliers’ 
belief that its interests are protected and valued, which in turn increases commitment and long-
term orientation (Johnson et al. 2002; Griffith and Lusch 2000). Perceptions of high procedural 
justice enhance suppliers’ belief that important decisions will be reached by mutual recognition 
(Luo 2008). A high level of procedural justice helps ensure high levels of supplier social 
compliance by communicating to each supplier that they are valued by the buying company as an 
exchange partner (Boyd et al. 2007). Procedural justice improves rule compliance by increasing 
adherence to the guidelines that govern a relationship (Colquitt 2001; Aquino 1995). Therefore, 
buyers’ procedural justice is likely to lead to suppliers being less likely to engage in social 
misconduct practices (Huo et al. 2016; Luo 2007b). Based on these arguments we propose the 
following: 
Proposition 2b Buyers’ procedural justice is positively related to suppliers’ internal social 
performance. 
Also to deal with demand uncertainty, heightened customer expectations and shrinking product 
life cycles, buyers may delay placing orders until very late, creating unrealistic and difficult to 
fulfil delivery expectations. Although most suppliers are likely to be understanding of the need 
for changes to relationship agreements due to unforeseen circumstances, when changes occur 
without warning or adequate notice, or without being accompanied by a plausible explanation 
and/or apology, suppliers quickly perceive unfair treatment by the buyer (Luo et al. 2015). 
Moreover, in global markets dominated by large buyers who often do not own production but are 
able to exert power through their prevailing marketing and brand position, suppliers may be 
forced to either institute excessive overtime working or increase work intensity (e.g. night and 
weekend work) to levels that exceed normal labour standards in order to meet order deadlines 
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(Smith and Barrientos 2005; Locke et al. 2009; Lam 2012).  In contrast, fair treatment is 
indicative of a buyer’s trustworthiness and concern for the utility of the supplier (Wang et al. 
2011). When a supplier feels that a buyer fully considers its concerns and informs it about major 
decisions, they feel comfortable and encouraged to communicate with that buyer (Huo et al. 
2016). Interactional justice helps to curtail breaches of both contractual obligations and relational 
norms by reducing uncertainties and increasing mutual understanding between buyer and supplier 
(Luo et al. 2015). If buyers, for example, provide suppliers with adequate explanation and timely 
information about unexpected changes to order volume or delivery time (procedures), suppliers 
will be in a much better position to undertake the necessary adjustments and increase capacity 
(for example by hiring new workers) to accommodate these unforeseen modifications (Jiang 
2009). It follows that suppliers are therefore likely to be less motivated to exhibit socially 
irresponsible opportunistic behaviours in order to protect their interests and to compensate for 
potential loss of contracts. Based on these arguments we propose the following: 
Proposition 2c Buyers’ interactional justice is positively related to suppliers’ internal 
social performance. 
We have disentangled how each dimension of justice can individually help to improve suppliers’ 
internal social performance. The differential effects of justice dimensions on suppliers’ internal 
social performance owes to the fact that each dimension relates to different aspects of the buyer-
supplier relationship. For the economic aspect, distributive justice can sustain suppliers’ internal 
social performance by providing an equitable share of the value created in the relationship that 
otherwise would demotivate supplier from engaging in activities to improve their employees’ 
welfare, increase investments in their working conditions and eradicate the use of child labour. 
Emphasising the structural aspect, procedural justice can sustain suppliers’ internal social 
performance through ensuring a consistent application of relationship procedures and doing so in 
accordance with contract specifications that guide the buyer-supplier agreement. Emphasising the 
social aspect, interactional justice can improve suppliers’ internal social performance by ensuring 
that adequate explanation and timely information regarding unexpected changes are provided so 
that suppliers have ample time to adapt. Prior research has highlighted that all three dimensions 
are essential and that a high level of one dimension will not compensate for a low level of another 
in buyer-supplier relationships (Wang et al. 2014; Luo et al. 2015; Narasimhan et al. 2013). 
Building on this view, we further argue that to realise a higher level of suppliers’ internal social 
performance all dimensions of justice should be satisfied. It is our contention that the presence of 
only one or even two of the justice dimensions is not sufficient to yield the desired improvement 
in suppliers’ internal social performance. For example, if buyers deliver a fair share of earnings to 
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the supplier, but still demand unrealistic delivery times and inconsistent order volumes 
(procedural justice), and do not provide sufficient and timely information (interactional justice), 
the social conditions at the suppliers’ operations are likely to remain relatively the same. 
Therefore, we propose that buyers should address all three dimensions simultaneously if they 
wish to improve suppliers’ internal social performance:    
Proposition 2d The higher the level of all three justice dimensions simultaneously 
(distributive, procedural and interactional), the higher will be suppliers’ 
internal social performance.   
The moderating role of justice 
The implementation of SSTPs and SSCPs requires a level of cooperation that can be difficult to 
establish on the part of suppliers, particularly when more powerful buyers simultaneously 
demand constant price reductions, shorter lead times and maintenance/improvement of quality 
(Khara and Lund-Thomsen 2012; Lund-Thomsen and Lindgreen 2014). This indicates that 
suppliers’ cooperation and engagement with buyers on sustainability issues through SSTPs and 
SSCPs is less likely to occur in the light of perceived unfairness in relationship outcomes, 
procedures and interactions. Therefore, in addition to the main direct effects of buyers’ justice on 
suppliers’ internal social performance, we further argue that a higher perception of buyers’ justice 
can also enhance suppliers’ internal social performance indirectly through increasing the 
effectiveness of SSTPs and SSCPs. In other words, under a higher perception of buyers’ justice 
dimensions, the impact of SSTPs on supplier’s internal social performance becomes significant, 
while the positive impact of SSCPs on suppliers’ internal social performance becomes stronger. 
The impact of SSTPs on supplier’s internal social performance becomes significant when 
supplier perceive buyer’s justice is due to the fact when buyers share the costs of SSTPs with 
supplier (usually supplier bear the majority of costs of certification and auditing) that creates 
perception of justice by suppliers, which in turn leads to more compliance (Yu 2008; Normann et 
al. 2017; Huq et al. 2014). 
Recent research has highlighted the potential role of informal mechanisms in contributing to the 
governance of sustainable supply chains (e.g. Jiang 2009; Alvarez et al. 2010). While the main 
research efforts in this context have identified trust and social norms as primary informal 
governance mechanisms, a growing literature on relational governance has featured the focal role 
of fairness in governing inter-organisational exchange relationships (e.g. Poppo and Zhou 2013; 
Luo 2007b). Procedural, distributive and interactional justice play a parallel role with existing 
structural and contract governance in motivating exchange partners to devote resources and 
communicate (Luo 2007b). Fairness has been shown to increase the effectiveness of formal 
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governance mechanisms (Samaha et al. 2011; Hernandez-Espallardo and Arcas-Lario 2003). 
According to Wang et al. (2011), fairness can serve two effects in supply chain relationships: 
compliance and maintenance. In the compliance effect, fairness facilitates inter-organisational 
task fulfilment whilst curtailing costs. In the maintenance effect, fairness nurtures partners’ 
satisfaction with collaboration and improves overall supply chain relationships.  
The moderating role of distributive justice 
A fair distribution of relationship outcomes is likely to strengthen the relationship between SSSC 
practices (SSTPs and SSCPs) and suppliers’ internal social performance. SSTPs involve 
measuring and monitoring suppliers’ performance which requires the exchange of information 
and inputs between buyer and supplier (Grosvold et al. 2014). Thus, information asymmetries 
between buyer and supplier can present an obstacle to implementing responsible practice 
(Ciliberti et al. 2009). Moreover, a supplier’s ability to receive and interpret requirements from 
the focal company is considered one of the key aspects in successfully implementing social 
responsibility (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009).  Distributive justice paves the way for mutual 
information sharing and knowledge transfer in the relationship (Liu et al. 2012). Fair sharing of 
relationship outcomes helps eliminate fears of exploitation and stimulates openness of 
communication between partners (Luo 2007b; Tyler and Bies 1990). Furthermore, when a 
relationship is built on equal distribution of gains and losses, both parties are more likely to be 
motivated and amenable to share valuable knowledge resources (Modi and Mabert 2007). 
Perception of equity of gains in the relationship, in turn, can reduce transaction and coordination 
costs as a partner would be inclined to exert less scrutiny and monitoring of efforts with its 
counterpart (Luo 2007a).   
Stakeholder utility and perception of shared value have been identified as key requirements for 
successful collaboration in global supply chains (Soundararajan and Brown 2016). Initiating 
capability development and training programmes requires joint activity with suppliers (Klassen 
and Vereecke 2012). According to Wagner et al. (2011), a buyer’s perception of supplier’s 
outcome fairness increases its willingness to continue the relationship and to collaborate in the 
future. The benefits of distributive justice facilitate dynamic adjustment and flexibility in supply 
chain relationships (Griffith et al. 2006). Fairness has been shown to play a pivotal role in 
encouraging suppliers’ participation in and compliance with joint programmes initiated by buyers 
(Gu and Wang 2011). Buyer-supplier collaboration on sustainability issues also requires the 
exchange of and investment in resources and technical skills (Klassen and Vereecke 2012). 
Enhanced distributive justice can facilitate mutual access to and the sharing of partners’ resources 
(Luo 2007a). When partners in a relationship receive an appropriate reward for their contributions 
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from the other party, they are more likely to become more confident in the fairness of future 
benefits and profit distribution, which increases further commitment and investments in the 
relationship (Kumar et al. 1995; Liu et al. 2012; Luo et al. 2015). SSCPs also require buyers and 
suppliers to exchange information and knowledge on new product development and process 
redesign that helps to guarantee health and safety for employees (Marshall et al. 2015; Klassen 
and Vereecke 2012). Higher perceptions of fair rewards encourage supply chain partners to 
exchange innovative ideas which promote the development of new products and improved 
processes (Shockley and Turner 2016). If suppliers feel they are fairly treated in terms of gains, 
they will invest and engage more in the buyers’ efforts to develop new innovations (Duffy et al. 
2013). Based on the above discussion we suggest the following:  
Proposition 3a Distributive justice moderates the relationship between SSTPs and 
suppliers’ internal social performance in such a fashion that the relationship becomes 
significant and positive when the supplier perceives a higher level of distributive justice. 
Proposition 3b Distributive justice moderates the relationship between SSCPs and 
suppliers’ internal social performance in such a fashion that the positive effect of SSCPs on 
suppliers’ internal social performance is stronger when the supplier perceives a higher 
level of distributive justice. 
The moderating role of procedural justice  
Procedural justice represented by suppliers’ perception of consistent, bias free, accurate, 
correctable and ethical procedures is expected to strengthen the link between SSSC practices 
(SSTPs and SSCPs) and suppliers’ internal social performance. SSTPs involve setting targets, 
and measuring and monitoring performance which requires the exchange of information and data 
between buyer and supplier (Grosvold et al. 2014). As already noted, a supplier’s ability to 
receive and interpret the requirements from the buyer is one of the key aspects of successfully 
implementing social responsibility (Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009). Procedural justice 
improves effective communication and reinforces mutual understanding between partners (Farh 
et al. 1997). Reciprocation and communication may be further improved because this common 
perception encourages openness in interactions and curbs fears of exploitation (Luo 2005). 
Procedural justice can also improve partners’ voluntary cooperation and knowledge sharing 
beyond their ‘normal’ contract responsibilities (Liu et al. 2012; Ling-yee 2010). This enhances 
governance structure, flexibility and functionality, which in turn offers a guiding framework 
under which participation can continue and advance (Luo 2008). Procedural justice improves 
relationship formalisation and the routinisation that guides daily exchanges between parties (Luo 
2007a). A perception of procedural justice can therefore improve commitment through more 
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active participation in joint decision making and through better compliance with relationship 
rules and improved partner unity (Allen and Meyer 1990). According to Klassen and Vereecke 
(2012), when supply chain partners have similar cultures and only a narrow gap of understanding, 
the complexity and time needed for monitoring social issues becomes less and reporting 
suppliers’ social performance becomes more precise. Procedural justice improves mutual actions 
between organisations by bridging culture gaps and reducing uncertainty during cooperation (Luo 
2005). 
SSCPs that focus on initiating supplier capability development and training programmes require 
joint activities with suppliers and the exchange of knowledge on new product development and 
process redesign that helps to improve and consolidate health and safety for employees (Marshall 
et al. 2015). Parties in a relationship use procedural justice as a guide in their commitment level 
to joint activities when limited prior information is available on the trustworthiness of their 
counterparts and on the assurance of the final outcomes from the relationship (Luo 2008). 
Moreover, procedural justice fosters trading partners’ commitment to joint efforts by increasing 
the belief and acceptance of shared goals and values (Brockner 2002; Johnson 1997). Procedural 
fairness can improve cooperation outcomes by increasing trust and reducing opportunism and 
conflicts between buyer and suppliers (Hofer et al. 2012; Luo 2008). Moreover, shared 
procedural justice can increase process efficiency and in turn reduce operating and administrative 
costs (Luo 2005). Fair procedures promote buyer-supplier learning of innovative ways to 
undertake new product and solutions development (Tjosvold et al. 2010). Buyer-supplier 
collaboration on sustainability issues also requires the allocation and exchange of resources and 
expertise (Klassen and Vereecke 2012). Procedural justice creates a flourishing and fertile setting 
for developing relationship-specific assets (i.e. individual skills, organisational practices, or 
technologies) within an exchange relationship (Luo 2005; Sapienza and Korsgaard 1996). This 
suggests that procedural justice contributes to enhancing cooperation by enabling more long-term 
risk and resource sharing (Luo 2008). Partners generally allocate their resource contributions and 
commitments to the relationship based on both contractual requirements and their own evaluation 
of justice (Luo 2005). When both partners perceive a high level of procedural justice however, 
they perceive that their interests are safeguarded through policies and accordingly they are more 
inclined to invest in and continue with the relationship (Liu et al. 2012; Huo et al. 2016). 
Moreover, parties are more likely to be willing to incur costs associated with adaptations to 
new/revised decisions in the relationship when they feel that the relationship is characterised by a 
high level of procedural justice because procedural justice provides an indication of assurance of 
long-term gains (Busenitz et al. 2004). Based on the above discussion we propose the following: 
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Proposition 4a Procedural justice moderates the relationship between SSTPs and 
suppliers’ internal social performance in such a fashion that the relationship becomes 
significant and positive when the supplier perceives a higher level of procedural justice. 
Proposition 4b Procedural justice moderates the relationship between SSCPs and 
suppliers’ internal social performance in such a fashion that the positive effect of SSCPs on 
suppliers’ internal social performance is stronger when the supplier perceives a higher 
level of procedural justice. 
The moderating role of interactional justice  
We also expect, and hence propose, that the interactional justice of buyers - which is supported 
by their provision of explanation and information about decisions and exhibiting a heightened 
level of interpersonal treatment - will exert a positive moderating effect on the relationship 
between SSSC practices (SSTPs and SSCPs) and suppliers’ internal social performance. In 
SSTPs, objectives are specified, performance is audited, progress is monitored, feedback is 
provided and rewards and punishments are administered to help to align suppliers’ behaviour 
with buyers’ criteria (Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Porteous et al. 2015). This process, therefore, 
requires the gathering and processing of information from buyers and suppliers (Grosvold et al. 
2014). However, information asymmetries between buyer and supplier can present a major 
obstacle in socially responsible supply chains (Ciliberti et al. 2009). Increased interactional 
justice fosters information processing through improved open communication and heightened 
willingness to share information and air differences, allowing boundary spanners to draw 
inferences and assumptions about their organisations and environments by exchanging available 
information and then using that information to define and solve problems (Luo 2006b). In fact, it 
has been argued that when a weak partner in an asymmetrical relationship receives an explanation 
underlying the setting of a specific policy or rule from their counterpart, it will become more 
motivated to share additional information (Griffith et al. 2006). Interactional justice and fair 
treatment in interpersonal relations strengthens relational attachment through heightened 
communication, socialisation and knowledge sharing between organisations (Luo 2007a; 2006a). 
Moreover, a supplier’s ability to receive and interpret the requirements of a buyer is, as 
mentioned previously, one of the key aspects of successfully implementing social responsibility 
(Andersen and Skjoett-Larsen 2009). Improved interactional justice helps generate standards of 
expected behaviour for social interactions and helps to create the cooperative climate (Luo 
2006b). According to Hu et al. (2016) during the implementation of multinational firms’ supply 
relationships, the respect shown by them during supplier auditing activities was critical in driving 
suppliers’ cooperation.  
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SSCPs require the exchange of, and investment in, resources and technical skills (Klassen and 
Vereecke 2012; Sancha et al. 2016). Exchange partners increase their willingness to commit to 
the relationship when they feel that they are treated with admiration and dignity by other partners 
(Beugré and Acar 2008). Effectively, both buyer and supplier are more likely to commit to the 
relationship when they both perceive a high level of informational justice (Liu et al 2012). 
Commitment enhances supply chain partners willingness to invest their time, effort and attention 
(Wang et al. 2014; Duffy et al. 2013). Moreover, through informational justice, both parties will 
provide valuable information that is important to the other, behaviour which can help reduce 
information asymmetry, decrease each party’s perceived uncertainty about the other’s behaviours, 
and promote specific investment in the relationship on the part of both parties (Trada and Goyal 
2017; Huo et al. 2016; Crosno et al. 2013). SSCPs also involve initiating capability development 
and training programmes which require joint activities (Klassen and Vereecke 2012). 
Interactional justice improves teamwork and joint efforts which prompt coordination, 
understanding and learning and consequently can curb coordination expenses and expenses 
incurred through otherwise bureaucratic processes (Luo 2007a). Interactional justice signals the 
counterpart’s trustworthiness and commitment to cooperation (Luo 2006b). When interactional 
justice is high, it is likely that the transacting parties develop greater trust (Wang et al. 2014), 
satisfaction (Ting 2011) and commitment towards one and other (Zaefarian et al. 2016). 
According to Narasimhan et al. (2013), interactional justice enables both buyer and supplier to 
exert less effort in achieving the relationship outcomes by resolving conflicts faster and through 
better assessment of needs in their collaboration. Based on the above discussion we suggest the 
following:  
Proposition 5a Interactional justice moderates the relationship between SSTPs and 
suppliers’ internal social performance in such a fashion that the relationship becomes 
significant and positive when the supplier perceives a higher level of interactional justice. 
Proposition 5b Interactional justice moderates the relationship between SSCPs and 
suppliers’ internal social performance in such a fashion that the positive effect of SSCPs on 
suppliers’ internal social performance is stronger when the supplier perceives a higher 
level of interactional justice. 
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Discussion  
Theoretical implications  
Sustainable supply chain management (SSCM) is an emerging field (Pagell and Shevchenko 
2014; Walker et al. 2014) now receiving considerable attention, as is reflected in the large 
number of SSCM publications (Ansari and Kant 2017; Johnsen et al. 2017). Despite the 
significant progress that has been made in the last decade, SSCM research remains largely silent 
on how to create truly sustainable supply chains form the social sustainability perspective (Pagell 
and Shevchenko 2014). Whereas prior research has traditionally drawn on different theoretical 
perspectives (e.g. TCE and the RV) to suggest that buying firms should use conventional 
practices (SSTPs and SSCPs) to ensure suppliers’ adherence to social expectations, we take a step 
forward and draw on organisational justice theory to introduce an alternative yet complementary 
approach to social sustainability. In particular, we provide theoretical insights into how buyers’ 
justice (distributive, procedural and interactional justice) can directly and indirectly drive 
suppliers’ internal social performance.  
Our study adds a different and new dimension to the current scholarly conversations on how 
buying firms can promote improvements in working conditions and labour rights at their 
suppliers’ workplace (e.g. Klassen and Vereecke 2012; Sancha et al. 2016; Huq et al. 2016).  We 
do this by providing a fresh relational approach that we believe can tackle some of the major root 
causes of suppliers’ social performance deficiencies. We have taken a nuanced view in our model 
to disentangle the individual and the interactive effects of distributive, procedural and 
interactional justice on suppliers’ internal social performance, which has not been advanced 
before in this context. We highlighted that providing an equal share of the value created in the 
relationship by buyers can potentially mitigate against suppliers engaging in unethical activities 
in their internal workplace, such as eroding their employees’ welfare, reducing investments in 
their working conditions and employing child labour. We also identified that ensuring a 
consistent application of relationship procedures (e.g. delivery times) that comply with contract 
specifications is expected to reduce the level of uncertainty suppliers face, which in turn can help 
to sustain their internal social performance. We also pointed out that when buyers provide reliable 
and timely information about unexpected changes (e.g. to order volumes), suppliers can more 
accurately and effectively plan, reschedule and control capacity in their factories using acceptable 
practices (e.g. hiring new employees) to meet these changes. Given these unique roles played by 
the three justice dimensions, we further suggested that they complement each other in driving 
suppliers’ internal social performance. Specifically, we explained that not exhibiting all three 
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dimensions may not yield the expected or desired level of improvement in suppliers’ social 
conditions.      
Our study also advances the current knowledge by providing an in-depth explanation of how 
distributive, procedural and interactional justice can underpin and enable the effective 
implementation of SSTPs and SSCPs by demonstrating the proposed moderating effects of all 
three justice dimensions on the relationship between SSSC practices and suppliers’ internal social 
performance. Although some prior studies have provided an initial understanding of the role of 
buyers’ justice in the implementation of SSSC management (Boyd et al. 2007; Theodorakopoulos 
et al. 2015), these studies provided only a limited view by focusing on procedural justice in the 
implementation process rather than buyers’ overall justice in the relationship, and hence failed to 
capture the importance and unique role of each of the three prevalent justice dimensions in the 
implementation of SSTPs and SSCPs. We have therefore extended prior research by stipulating 
how justice returns, procedures and interactions can improve the implementation of SSTPs and 
SSCPs. We highlighted that when suppliers perceive the relationship being fair in terms of 
returns, perceive procedures to be consistent, and perceive the provision of timely information 
and proper justification for unpredictable changes, suppliers become more confident in the 
relationship future and more willing and motived to cooperate and commit to the implementation 
of SSTPs and SSCPs. Suppliers use relationship justice as a frame of reference to guide their 
level of commitment to social sustainability in the form of frequent sharing of knowledge and 
allocating sustainability-specific financial and human investments.  
Managerial implications  
Supply chain managers are constantly under pressure from different stakeholders to enhance the 
conditions under which their outsourced items are being produced. Managing the social issues of 
suppliers, particularly those located in remote areas, is a critical task. Our study provides a 
number of practical implications that can help supply chain managers to better understand and 
manage socially sustainable supply chains. First, both SSTPs and SSCPs are unlikely alone to be 
effective in driving suppliers to enhance the social conditions within their internal environment. 
Our synthesis of the previous research on SSCM indicates that in particular, SSTPs are less likely 
to influence suppliers to improve social sustainability performance. A successful implementation 
of SSTPs and SSCPs often requires a level of cooperation that can be difficult to establish, 
particularly on the part of suppliers. Supply chain managers need to establish the conditions that 
stimulate active participation and engagement of suppliers in their social responsibility 
programmes.  
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Second, our work indicates that creating the perception of a fair relationship with suppliers 
appears to account for a change in suppliers’ motivations and an increase in suppliers’ 
commitment towards the SSSC initiatives established by buyers. That is to say, that a perception 
of overall distributive, procedural and interactional justice stimulates frequent communication 
and knowledge sharing, facilitates joint activities and can increase resource commitment within 
the relationship – all of which are key aspects supporting successful SSSC practices 
implementation. Therefore, supply chain managers need to ensure that distributive, procedural 
and interactional justice are established in parallel with SSTPs and SSCPs to effectively improve 
suppliers’ internal social performance. For example, since the perception of distribution justice 
vary according to what and how inputs and outcomes are valued, managers can share information 
with suppliers to increase transparency and reduce suppliers concerns for unfair returns. 
Moreover, managers can ensure stable and consistent application of the procedures over time (at 
least over the short term) and most importantly across suppliers, and that equal opportunities exist 
to modify and correct these procedures at any stage of the relationship to develop a perception of 
procedural justice. Furthermore, holding regular relationship steering meetings, establishing 
integrated information system and interaction routines would be rich mechanisms for managers to 
share timely information and develop a mutual respect that are necessary to foster a perception of 
interactional justice. 
Finally, our study indicates that the effect of justice goes beyond helping firms to recover from 
existing social performance transgressions, by directly constraining suppliers’ possible 
engagement in social misconduct in the first place. Each dimensions of justice (distributive, 
procedural and interactional) serves a unique role in creating and sustaining the social conditions 
in suppliers’ facilities. A fair distribution of relationship outcomes can reduce a supplier’s 
intention to involve itself in unethical activities that it may otherwise feel are necessary due to the 
presence of perceived inequity. Moreover, a consistent application of fair relationship procedures 
can help to ensure stable supplier operations that in turn minimise the likelihood of poor practices 
such as the implementation of long and tiring shift work. Furthermore, a constant share of 
adequate and timely information will support suppliers in their efforts to take responsible actions, 
for example, to cope with unexpected demand fluctuations, rather than using unethical practices 
to respond to sudden increases in order size. These arguments infer that supply chain managers 
should invest in activities, practices and policies that promote the development of a perception of 
the three facets of justice when they deal with suppliers. Supply chain managers need to work 
regularly with suppliers through dedicated and ongoing interactions directed at aligning their 
understanding regarding relationship returns and procedures. 
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Future research directions 
This paper provides the foundation for several avenues of future research. First, although very 
few studies have examined the individual impact of SSTPs and SSCPs on suppliers’ social 
performance, their joint effect has yet to be understood. In this paper we assume neither a 
substitution nor synergistic relationship between SSTPs and SSCPs. Sancha et al. (2016) recently 
revealed that these two sets of practices may be related in the sense that SSTPs may be 
antecedents to SSCPs. This might indicate that SSTPs and SSCPs are mutually exclusive and 
should not be implemented simultaneously. Wagner (2010) previously found a detrimental 
effect of implementing the indirect and direct supplier development activities simultaneously 
on suppliers’ operational performance and capabilities improvement. Is this the case in the 
context of suppliers’ social performance? A better understanding of the implications of the joint 
implementation of SSSC practices would help buying firms in their efforts to implement the most 
effective combination of SSSC practices to improve suppliers’ social performance. Future 
research should therefore extend our work by considering and examining what, if any, inter-
relationships may exist between SSCPs and SSTPs. 
The second avenue that we recommend is the empirical examination of our proposed conceptual 
framework within operating supply chains. Such empirical examination can confirm or otherwise 
whether buyers’ justice serves as a substitute for and/or a complement for SSSC practices in 
driving the social improvements of suppliers. Moreover, future testing of our framework would 
reveal the relative importance of the three dimensions of justice to suppliers’ internal social 
performance, and to what extent that may differ in different supply chain contexts (e.g. industry 
or geographical location, amongst many others). Future research can also provide more insights 
by disentangling which dimension of justice is important in relation to which type of SSSC 
practice. Distributive justice, arguably, is likely to be more relevant and effective in increasing 
supplier’s social performance in parallel with SSTPs, while procedural and interactional justices 
are likely to be more salient in conjunction with SSCPs.  However this needs empirical 
verification.  
A third salient research avenue is to extend our model and empirically examine whether the direct 
impact of buyers’ justice on suppliers’ internal social performance holds across different 
governance forms, for example formal versus relational. Further insights could be gained by 
using the logic of self-interest and group-value models (Lind and Tyler 1988) in the 
organisational justice literature to explore which justice dimension is more important in which 
model or governance domain. Specifically, based on the self-interest model, we might expect that 
in transactional governance, distributive justice is more important in driving suppliers’ internal 
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social performance. In contrast, based on the group-value model, arguably we would predict that 
in relational governance it is procedural and interactional justice which would be more salient. 
Moreover, future research investigations should include relationship contextual variables such as 
dependence structure and relationship age to refine our proposed relationships.  
Fourth, in our theoretical development in this paper we have examined and proposed the role of 
overall relationship fairness, rather than specifically the perceived fairness of the implementation 
of SSSC practices (e.g. Boyd et al. 2007). The implementation of SSSC practices requires 
investments and resources by both parties and may yield returns. Another promising future 
research avenue, therefore, is to explore how suppliers react to perceived fairness or unfairness in 
the implementation process of SSSC practices. Specifically, future research could use 
longitudinal case studies to explore how the perception of fairness in SSTPs and SSCPs develops 
during the implementation and how it might affect the participation of relationship partners in 
these practices. For example, would the use initially of SSTPs lead to a perception of unfairness 
as it inevitably is likely to require more costs on the part of supplier (Huq et al. 2014), whilst the 
use initially of SSCPs would lead to a perception of fairness, and consequently increase supplier 
satisfaction and compliance with the overall implementation of SSCPs and SSTPs?  
Fifth, valuable insights can be gained from examining our framework by collecting data from 
buyer-supplier dyads and including suppliers’ workers’ views in the analysis. More specifically, 
perceptions of justice can be sought from the suppliers’ side, details about the implementation of 
SSSC practices can be obtained from the buyers’ side, and suppliers’ internal social performance 
can be captured from the suppliers’ workers’ perspective. Although the field of SSCM has 
recently made good progress in developing reliable measures of sustainability performance (in 
particular environmental) by using secondary data rather than relying on perceptions (Pagell and 
Shevchenko 2014), the perceptions of marginalized workers have been overlooked (e.g. social 
issues). Moreover, the difficulty in quantifying the social performance element of overall 
sustainability performance has been identified as one of the main reasons for its relative absence 
from SSCM research (Hutchins and Sutherland 2008). Future research could therefore use intra-
organisational justice dimensions (i.e. distributive, procedural and interactional) to capture 
suppliers’ internal social performance from the workers’ perspective. We believe such an 
approach would provide a more comprehensive measure covering several critical social issues 
that may be present, or even prevalent, in suppliers’ operations/premises, including the fairness of 
payment (distributive justice), the fairness of procedures that govern the distribution of outcomes 
(procedural justice), and perhaps most importantly the way workers are treated (interactional 
justice). This approach could also be effective in reducing potential bias (i.e. social desirability) 
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that may arise directly from buyer or supplier top management reporting on this type of 
performance. Top management perception of what are acceptable working conditions may not 
match the views of other stakeholders (Pagell and Shevchenko 2014) such as suppliers’ 
employees.   
Finally, the high failure rate and the challenges associated with implementing SSSC practices 
should motivate scholars to study how to more effectively coordinate them to deliver on their 
promise of improving suppliers’ social performance. We have identified justice dimensions as 
important relational factors that can potentially increase the effectiveness of the implementation 
of SSSC initiatives. Future research could explore other relational factors that drive the 
implementation of SSSC practices. An increasing amount of research has highlighted the critical 
role of social capital in enhancing a variety of aspects in supply chain relationships including 
information sharing (Li et al. 2014), learning (Kohtamäki and Bourlakis 2012), resilience 
(Johnson et al. 2013), and in reducing opportunism (Wang et al. 2013; Lioliou and 
Zimmermann 2015).  Arguably these are all essential for the successful implementation of 
SSSC practices. Therefore, future research could explore the moderating effect of social capital 
dimensions (i.e. relational, cognitive and structural) on the relationship between SSSC practices 
(SSTPs and SSCPs) and suppliers’ internal social performance.   
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Table (1): The transactional and collaboration governance approaches 
Characteristics Transactional approach Collaboration approach 
Main driver  
Legitimacy  Legitimacy and possible 
competitive advantage (e.g. social 
innovation) 
Timeframe  Short-term  Long-term  
Theoretical basis Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)  Relational View (RV) 
Main assumptions  
Supplier performance are driven by 
heavy monitoring and auditing  
Supplier performance are driven by 
close collaboration and capability 
building  
Main proposed mechanisms  
Monitoring; auditing; code of 
conduct; third-party certification 
and; contracts.    
Supplier development; resource 
sharing (financial and human) and; 
knowledge sharing 
Limitations  
Lack of suppliers’ involvement in 
setting sustainability goals; lack of 
sharing the implementation costs; 
neglecting suppliers’ social and 
cultural contexts.  
Applicable to selected suppliers; 
long time needed to develop, 
implement and achieve the 
expected outcomes and; high 
implementation costs. 
Direction of communication  
Often one-way communication 
(Top-down approach) 
Two-way communication  
Involved party (s) 
Buyer; Supplier; third-party auditor Buyer; Supplier; NGOs and; civil 
society  
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Table (2): An analysis of empirical research that examined the role and outcomes of justice in supply chain relationships 
Author(s) 
Justice 
dimensions Type of supply 
chain 
relationship 
The perceiver of 
justice   
Method 
Context  
Relevant findings 
D
i
s
 
P
r
o
 
in
te
 
In
fo
. 
Industry Country 
Kumar et al. (1995) ✓ ✓   
Manufacturer-
dealer 
 Dealer 
 
Survey 
 
Automobile  
Across 
countries 
Higher perception of distributive and procedural fairness enhances relationship quality. However, distributive 
justice becomes more important in determining relationship quality as the outcomes increase, while procedural 
justice becomes more important as environment uncertainty increases.  
Patterson et al. (1996) ✓    Buyer-supplier Buyer Survey 
Management 
consultant services  
Not 
specified 
Client’s (buyer) perception of outcome fairness of the service provider (supplier) is positively related to 
satisfaction, which subsequently increases the client’s repurchase intention.  
Scheer et al. (2003) ✓    
 
Manufacturer-
dealer 
Dealer Survey Automobile  
Across 
countries 
Dutch and US dealers react negatively to negative inequity by exhibiting increased hostility, lower trust and lower 
relationship continuity. When they experience positive inequity, Dutch dealers react negatively by showing lower 
trust and relationship continuity and increasing guilty, whereas US dealers express no reaction. 
Yilmaz et al. (2004) ✓ ✓   
Manufacturer-
dealer 
 Dealer Survey 
Doors and window 
systems   
Turkey 
Manufacturers’ financial and sales performance and operational support are shown to enhance the perception of 
both distributive and procedural fairness, while delivery performance enhances the perception of procedural 
fairness, which in turn increases dealer’s satisfaction.  
Suh (2005) ✓ ✓ 
  
Supplier-retailer  Supplier Survey Retail South Korea 
Procedural justice fosters the relationship by curbing conflict and increasing trust and commitment. Distributive 
justice enhances relationship quality by reducing conflict and increasing commitment.  
Brown et al. (2006) ✓ ✓   
Supplier-
wholesaler 
Wholesaler Survey 
 
Multiple industries  
US 
The perceptions of supplier’s distributive and procedural justice increase wholesaler’s satisfaction, however; for 
procedural justice only under a high level of distributive justice. Both distributive and procedural justices limit the 
conflict between partners.  
Griffith et al. (2006) ✓ ✓   
Manufacturer-
distributor 
 Distributor Survey Multiple industries US 
Perception of procedural and distributive justice increase partner’s performance through enhanced its attitude of 
long-term orientation and behaviour responses (i.e. flexibility and information sharing).  
Ling-yee (2010)  ✓   
Manufacturer-
agent 
 Manufacturer Survey Electronics  China 
Perceived procedural justice enhances agent’s extra role behaviours (voluntary cooperation and knowledge 
sharing), which in turn improves relationship performance. 
Yanamandram and 
White (2010) 
✓ ✓ ✓  Buyer-supplier  Buyer Survey Business services   
Not 
specified 
Distributive, procedural and interactional justices are positively related to the buyer satisfaction with complaint 
handling in a B2B service context, which in turn increases repurchase intention. 
Jambulingam et al. 
(2011) 
✓ ✓   
Wholesaler-
retailer 
 Retailer Survey Pharmaceutical  
 
US 
Only under the condition of symmetric independence, trust completely mediates the relationship between fairness 
and loyalty. However, under the conditions of perceived independence or asymmetric buyer dependence, 
procedural and distributive fairness directly increase loyalty between supply chain partners. 
Samaha et al. (2011) ✓   
 
 
 
Seller-reseller  Reseller Survey Multiple industries  
Not 
specified 
Perceived unfairness reduces reseller’s cooperation and flexibility and magnifies the negative effects of conflict 
and opportunism on cooperation and flexibility. Perceived unfairness erodes the effectiveness of using contracts in 
governing the relationship.  
Wagner et al. (2011) ✓    Buyer-supplier  Buyer Survey Multiple industries  
Across 
countries  
Buyer perception of supplier’s outcome fairness during project collaboration increases the buyer tendency to 
continue the relationship and to collaborate in future. 
Hofer et al. (2012) ✓ ✓   Buyer-supplier  Buyer Survey Not specified Brazil 
Distributive and procedural justices increase buyer’s trust and long-term orientation towards the relationship, 
boosting cooperation, which enables buyer to pursue operational improvements.  
Liu et al. (2012) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
Manufacturer-
distributor 
 Dyads Survey Appliance  China 
High level of mutually perceived justice (i.e. distributive, procedural, interactional and informational) by both 
parties lead to increased relationship performance through induced commitment between parties, enhanced 
knowledge sharing and encouraged investment in the relationship.  
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Brock et al. (2013) ✓ ✓ ✓  Buyer-supplier   Buyer Survey Construction  
Not 
specified 
Both distributive justice and procedural justice positively related to the satisfaction with complaint handling of a 
service failure in the context of B2B.  
Crosno et al. (2013) ✓ ✓ ✓  Supplier-retailer  Retailer Survey 
Consumer 
electronics  
Norway 
Only interactional justice alleviates the impact of assets specific investment on passive opportunism in the 
relationship.  
Narasimhan et al. 
(2013) 
✓ ✓ ✓  Survey Buyer-supplier 218 buyers Multiple 
Not 
specified 
An increase in procedural, distributive or interactional justice improves performance only if the specific justice 
dimension is the bottleneck element in the relationship. All three elements of justice are essential and a high level 
of one of the justice dimension will not compensate for a low level of another.  
Praxmarer-Carus et al. 
(2013) 
✓    Buyer-supplier  Supplier Survey Multiple industries 
Across 
countries 
Suppliers’ perceived share of earnings in supplier development programme enhances perceived distributive 
justice, which positively increases supplier satisfaction with the programme.   
Duffy et al. (2013) ✓ ✓ ✓ ✓ 
 
Supplier-retailer 
 Supplier Survey Retail  UK 
Only distributive justice increases supplier investment and engagement in buyer’s customer relationship 
management (CRM) strategy. Surprisingly, procedural justice is negatively related to supplier’s engagement in 
buyer’s CRM. 
Wang et al. (2014) ✓ ✓ ✓  Buyer-supplier  Buyer Survey Multiple industries China 
Suppliers’ distributive and procedural justice can recoup buyer’s damaged trust in their abilities, integrity and 
benevolence, while interactional justice can regain buyer’s trust in their benevolence.  
Poppo and Zhou 
(2014) 
✓ ✓   Buyer-supplier  Dyads Survey Multiple industries China 
Procedural justice mediates the relationship between complex contracts and exchange performance, while contract 
recurrence mediates the relationship between distributive justice and performance. 
Hoppner et al. (2014) ✓ ✓   Buyer-seller  Seller Survey Multiple industries US Only procedural justice positively affects relationship performance. 
Liu et al. (2015) ✓ ✓ ✓  Buyer-supplier Supplier 
Multiple 
Cases 
Not specified 
New 
Zealand 
The authors developed a four-step sales process model to regain B2B customer reacquisition. In the 
implementation step, the integration of distributive, procedural and interactional justice facilities customer 
reacquisition.  
Luo et al. (2015) ✓ ✓ ✓  
Manufacturer-
distributor 
 Dyads Survey Home appliance  China 
Distributive justice suppresses strong form opportunism and procedural justice attenuates weak form opportunism, 
while interactional justice alleviates both forms of opportunism, which subsequently improves relationship 
performance and reduces governance costs. 
Kaynak et al. (2015) ✓ ✓   
Wholesaler-
retailer 
 Retailer Survey Pharmaceutical  Turkey 
Distributive and procedural justice increase relationship continuity. Both distributive and procedural justice have 
no moderating effect on the relationship between wholesaler’s unethical behaviours and relationship continuity. 
Hemmert et al. (2016) ✓ ✓   Buyer-supplier  Supplier Survey Multiple industries  South Korea 
Legal protection and government support increase buyer’s procedural justice, whereas social networks increase 
buyer’s distributive justice. Both procedural and distributive justice, in turn, positively related to supplier’s trust. 
Huo et al. (2016) ✓ ✓ ✓  Buyer-supplier  Buyer Survey Multiple industries  China 
Supplier’s procedural and distributive justice increase buyer’s specific investment, whereas interactional justice 
positively affects communication, which reduces opportunism. Only procedural justice directly curbs buyer’s 
opportunism.  
Zaefarian et al. (2016) ✓ ✓ ✓  
Manufacturer-
supplier 
 Supplier Survey Automobile  Iran 
Distributive and interactional justice increase trust and commitment, which in turn, increase sales growth. 
Surprisingly, procedural justice has no effect on trust and commitment. 
Trada and Goyal 
(2017) 
✓ ✓ ✓  
Supplier-
distributor 
Dyads Survey  Pharmaceutical India 
Distributive, procedural and interactional unfairness directly increase distributor opportunism and it magnified 
with higher level of supplier investment, environmental uncertainty and behavioural uncertainty.  
Note: Dist = Distributional; Proc = Procedural; Inte = Interactional; Info = Informational.   
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 Figure (1): A conceptual model of the role of justice in the implementation of 
sustainable supply chain management 
 
Buyer’s Justice 
P1a (0); P1b (+)  
Supplier’s internal 
social performance 
SSCPs 
SSTPs 
Procedural 
 Justice  
Distributive 
 Justice  
P3a – b (+); P4a – b (+); P5a - b (+) 
Interactional 
Justice  
SSSC Practices P2a, b, c, d (+)  
Note:         denotes the proposed direct main effects; and         denotes the proposed moderating effects 
